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Abstract
We use a recently developed non-parametric approach to analyze the variation in la-
bor productivity growth across China's provinces. This approach imposes less structure
on the data than the standard growth accounting framework and allows for a breakdown
of labor productivity into capital deepening, e±ciency gains, and technological progress.
We ¯nd that capital deepening is the prime factor behind the change in the distribu-
tional dynamics of the labor productivity: on average capital deepening accounts for 75
percent of total labor productivity growth, while improvements in e±ciency and tech-
nological progress account for 7 percent and 18 percent, respectively. We also ¯nd that
while improvements in e±ciency levels are higher in initially less productive provinces,
relatively more productive provinces bene¯ted more from technological progress than
less developed ones.
JEL Classi¯cation: O1, O2, O3, O4, O53, and P2
Keywords: Provincial Growth in China, Labor Productivity, Convergence, Data Envel-
opment Analysis
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1 Introduction
Since the 1978 economics reforms, China's growth record has been impressive, but the
contribution of its provinces to per capita income growth has been highly uneven.1 Although
average annual growth of real per capita GDP has picked up across all regions, coastal
provinces have tended to grow faster than northern and western provinces. According
to Aziz and Duenwald (2003), real GDP per capita in coastal provinces such as Fujian,
Guangdong, and Zhejiang grew at an average annual rate of twice that of western provinces
such as Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai during 1978-97. The dispersion of growth rates has
not been purely a re°ection of di®erent stages of development. Indeed, among the initially
poorer provinces those in the west have fallen further behind, while those at or near the
coast have caught up with or even surpassed provinces that had the highest per capita
incomes at the start of economic reforms. This uneven performance has been re°ected in a
growing income disparity across regions posing a key challenge to policymakers in Beijing.
Several studies investigating the di®erences in economic performance across China's
provinces conclude no tendency toward absolute convergence in terms of real per capita
GDP over the past two and a half decades. Bell, Khor, and Kochhar (1993) and Jian
et al. (1996) ¯nd that income dispersion has declined between 1981 and 1990 as poorer
provinces tended to grow faster than richer ones. When the sample period is extended, this
result is not maintained. The absence of absolute convergence among China's provinces
is in contrast with the behavior of US states, Japanese prefectures, and selected regions
in western Europe, where absolute convergence appears to be the norm rather than the
exception over extended periods of time (Barro and i Martin 2004).
However, there is evidence of conditional convergence with provinces converging to
unique steady states distinguished by structural factors and preferential economic policies,
which have been part of China's dual track approach to economic reforms. D¶ emurger et al.
1Jian, Sachs, and Warner (1996), Li, Liu, and Rebelo (1998), D¶ emurger et al. (2002), Dayal-Gulati and
Husain (2002), and Aziz and Duenwald (2003).2
(2002) ¯nd that, after controlling for openness and proximity to fast growing economies in
East-Asia, growth in coastal provinces bene¯t signi¯cantly from preferential policies, which
have fostered marketization and internationalization. Dayal-Gulati and Husain (2002) show
that the prevalence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and a high ratio of bank loans-to-
deposits|an indication of large directed lending|are often associated with lower growth.
They also ¯nd that the coastal and north/northeastern regions were able to attract more FDI
because of their relative prosperity and more developed infrastructure, which contributed
to the high growth rates of these regions.
Previous studies explore the dynamics of provincial growth using the augmented Slow
model. However, in this paper, we examine the evolution of three components of labor
productivity growth: e±ciency gains (movements toward the production frontier), techno-
logical progress (outward shifts of the production frontier), and capital deepening (move-
ments along the production frontier). This decomposition allows us to investigate how the
dynamics of each component a®ect the growing income disparity across provinces.
For our analysis we use a recently developed non-parametric technique known as Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). For a given date in our sample period we construct a pro-
duction frontier for China, as a whole, using all observed input-output combinations at the
province level. The inputs are capital and labor, and the output is GDP. After identify-
ing the frontier, we can measure the e±ciency level of each province with respect to the
frontier. Having determined the evolution of capital-labor ratios and e±ciency indices for
each province, we can derive the contribution of technological progress to labor productivity
growth in each province.
DEA was developed by Farrell (1957) and Afriat (1972), and was further extended by
FÄ are et al. (1994, 1995) and Kumar and Russell (2002).2 Our approach is similar to that of
Kumar and Russell (2002), except that in constructing the production possibility frontier
2FÄ are et al. (1994) use DEA to analyze the productivity growth in 17 OECD countries, while Kumar
and Russell used the same technique with a di®erent decomposition of labor productivity to analyze the
productivity performance across 57 countries in the world.3
at time t we follow Diewert (1980) by using all data available up to time t; rather than
just the observations at time t. This modi¯cation prevents technology from regressing,
an unrealistic feature in the Kumar and Russell (2002) ¯ndings. Using DEA has several
advantages over standard growth accounting. First, in this approach the production frontier
is directly constructed from the data. Hence we do not have to impose any restrictions other
than a functional form that satis¯es a constant returns to scale technology. Second, our
approach allows us to identify separately the contributions of e±ciency and technological
improvements to productivity growth. Finally, our approach does not impose any kind of
structure on markets, whereas in the standard growth accounting framework it is assumed
that markets are competitive. This assumption is possibly critical in the case of China,
where government regulation of markets is still extensive.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, labor productivity growth in China's
provinces has largely been driven by capital deepening. In particular, we ¯nd that on
average capital deepening accounts for about 75 percent of total labor productivity growth,
while e±ciency and technological improvements account for about 7 percent and 18 percent,
respectively. Second, the capital deepening is also the driving factor behind the changes in
the distributional dynamics of the labor productivity over the last two decades {the initial
distribution of labor productivity has unimodal shape, while its 1998 distribution has new
peaks. Finally, while improvements in e±ciency levels are higher in initially less productive
provinces, relatively more productive provinces bene¯ted more from technological progress
than less developed ones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the construction of
the country-wide production frontier along with the calculation of e±ciency levels and
demonstrates how we decompose labor productivity into the three components described
above. In section 3, we present our results and discuss their implications. Section 4 o®ers
some concluding remarks.4
2 Theoretical Framework
Let Zt = (Kt;Lt) denote a bundle of capital-labor inputs to produce a single output Yt at
time t: We denote this single output technology by means of a production function Ft that
gives the maximum amount Ft(Zt) of output that can be produced using input amounts






+ : Ft(Zt) ¡ Yt ¸ 0 and Zt ¸ 0
o
: (1)
The set of boundary points of Pt is called the production (or transformation) frontier,
which we shall denote by ~ Ft and is completely characterized by production function Ft; that
is, (Kt;Lt;Yt) 2 ~ Ft if and only if Ft(Kt;Lt) = Yt: With these de¯nitions, any input-output
combination in the interior of the production set represents an ine±cient transformation of
Zt into Yt and the distance between such a combination and boundary will be a measure of
the level of ine±ciency. Thus, in order to measure the scale of ine±ciency, it is important
to identify the production frontier.
In this paper, we con¯ne ourselves to constant returns to scale (CRS) production tech-
nologies, i.e. Ft is a CRS production function. With this assumption, Ft(Kt;Lt) = Yt can
be rewritten as ft(kt) = yt; where kt = Kt=Lt; yt = Yt=Lt; and ft(kt) = Ft(Kt=Lt;1): With






+ : ft(kt) ¡ yt ¸ 0 and kt ¸ 0
o
: (2)
Note that when Ft exhibits CRS, ft exhibits non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS).
As discussed in the introduction, our approach to constructing production sets (and
frontiers) is data-driven. Roughly speaking, we de¯ne the production set at time t as the
smallest convex set that envelopes all available data at time t: The boundary of this set will
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represents the intensive form of the input-output
vector of province i at time ¿: As Kumar and Russell (2002) noted, this construction implies
that each point in the production set is either a linear combination of observed points or a





¿ · 1; we make the production technology exhibit NIRS (Afriat 1972). Note
that this production technology also satis¯es the free-disposal condition, that is inputs and
output can be disposed of at no cost. It is important to emphasize that in constructing
the frontier we follow Diewert (1980) in that we use all available data up to time t: This
approach is di®erent from the one developed by Kumar and Russell (2002) and FÄ are et al.
(1994), who construct the frontier by only using the input-output data observed at time t:
We incorporated previous observations to prevent the possibility of technological regress.4
Given the production frontier Ft; we are now ready to describe how to calculate e±ciency
indexes. For a given point (kt;yt)
0
2 Pt; following Farrell (1957), we de¯ne the output-based
(or Farrell) e±ciency function as follows:
Et(kt;yt) = minf¸ : (kt;yt=¸)
0
2 Ptg: (4)
In words, this function is de¯ned as the inverse of the maximum proportional amount that
labor productivity yt can be expanded, while remaining in the production set Pt; given the
capital intensity kt: For each province i; we calculate the e±ciency index ¸i
t at time t by
solving the following linear programming problem:
3For an excellent discussion of the construction of production frontiers and DEA, see Farrell (1957), Afriat
(1972), and FÄ are et al. (1995). In particular, FÄ are et al. (1995) give a comprehensive account of various
extensions of DEA.
4Nothing suggests that China has experienced a decline in its technological knowledge since it started
economic reforms. Hence, the technology that was available at date t was at least as advanced as the
technology available at date s < t: However, our method is data driven and by not including previous
observations it could produce an estimate of the production set at date t; which does not include all the

































¿ ¸ 0; ¿ = 1;:::;t; and j = 1;:::;I:
Having calculated the e±ciency indexes we can decompose productivity growth into
e±ciency, technological change, and capital deepening components as in Kumar and Russell
(2002).5
To illustrate the decomposition of output per worker, Figure 1 depicts two production
sets for time periods s and t; with s < t: Points (ks;ys) and (kt;yt) represent the input-
output combinations of the same economy in periods s and t; respectively. Note that these
observed input-output combinations are in the interiors of the corresponding production
sets, hence, they are ine±cient. Given ks units of input, under the production technology
available at time s; this economy can produce at most fs(ks) = ys=¸s units of output,
where ¸s is the e±ciency index for the observed production. Similarly, when the input
level is kt; the maximum amount of output that can be produced, under the production
technology available at time t; is Ft(kt) = yt=¸t; where ¸t is the e±ciency index for the







5FÄ are et al. (1994) propose a di®erent method involving the decomposition of the (Malumquist) produc-
tivity index into technical change, pure e±ciency change, and scale change. We chose to follow the method
in Kumar and Russell (2002) because it allows us to assess the role of capital deepening in productivity
growth.7











Frontier at time t
Frontier at time s
(ks,ys)
(kt,yt)
Multiplying the numerator and denominator on the right hand side by fs(kt); which
is the maximum output that can be produced with input level kt under the ¯rst period













The left hand side of this equation represents the change in output per worker between
periods s and t: The ¯rst term on the right hand side represents the change in e±ciency over
these two periods. The second term represents the shift in the production frontier at capital
intensity of kt: The last term represents the change in maximum output per worker owing
to the change in capital intensity between the two periods. Thus, identity (5) decomposes
labor productivity into three components: change in e±ciency change, change in technology,
and change in capital intensity. Note that this is not the only way to decompose output
per worker. Considering again equation (6), multiplying the numerator and denominator
on the right hand side by ft(ks); which is the maximum output that can be produced with













where each term on the right hand side is interpreted in the same way as in equation (7).





fs(kt): Hence, we have two di®erent representations of technical change
(and of the change in potential output owing to the change in capital intensity, that is the
third term in equations 7 and 8). Following Caves et al. (1982), FÄ are et al. (1994), and
Kumar and Russell (2002), we avoid having two arbitrary decompositions of output per





















Taking the logarithms of both sides of (9) and dividing by t¡s (number of years between
two periods), we have
gy = geff + gtech + gcap; (10)
where gy represents the average annual growth rate of output per worker, and geff; gtech; gcap
are the average annual growth rate of e±ciency index, the average annual growth rate of
technical progress, and the average annual growth rate of the potential outputs (due to the
change in capital intensity) between two periods, respectively. This completes the theoret-
ical framework of our approach. Before moving further, let us recap brie°y what we have
introduced in this section. We started with the construction of a production frontier from
the observed data. Then we showed how to measure the associated (in)e±ciency indexes by
solving the corresponding linear programming problem. Finally, we illustrated how, after
having calculated the e±ciency indexes, growth in output per worker can be decomposed
into changes in e±ciency, technology, and capital intensity.
Several remarks are in order. First, the production frontier is constructed from the
data and consequently it is de¯ned relative to the best technology of the provinces in our9
sample. Thus, this frontier may be below the true frontier, which in turn implies that
the e±ciency indexes represent lower bounds of true ine±ciencies. In the standard growth
accounting framework the true frontier is also not known, but in that framework each
province's performance is compared only with its previous-year performance, not with a
common benchmark across all provinces. Moreover, since we want to compare the relative
performance of the provinces, we think that our non-parametric approach is more suitable.6
Second, our approach allow for the separation of changes in e±ciency from technological
progress. In the standard growth accounting approach, each province is assumed to be on
\its" own frontier, hence it is impossible to make the same separation. Third, in development
accounting framework calculation of TFP levels requires that technological progress is Hicks-
neutral, which we did not have to assume in our analysis. Indeed, our analysis in the
next section suggests that technological progress is not Hicks-neutral. Finally, and more
importantly, in calculating productivity growth rates we did not impose any condition on
market behavior, while in growth accounting TFP is derived under the assumption that
markets are competitive. To illustrate this point consider the following production function
Y (t) = F(K(t);L(t);t);
where t represents an index of technology at time t: Taking the logarithm of both sides,
di®erentiating with respect to time, and rearranging the terms, we obtain
gA = gY ¡ ²KgK + ²LgL;
where ²K and ²L are elasticity of capital and labor with respect to output and gX denotes the
growth rate of the variable X: In practice, we do not know these elasticities. To overcome
this di±culty it is assumed that (i) F exhibits CRS, which we also assumed, and (ii) markets
are competitive, which implies that the labor elasticity can be replaced with the share of
6Our approach does not take into account possible measurement errors. There is an alternative technique,
known as the stochastic frontier approach, to calculate the e±ciency indexes under possible measurement er-
rors. We did not consider this approach in our study, since its implementation imposes additional restrictions
on the functional form of the frontier and error terms.10
labor in total output. For advanced countries with considerable market competition, it may
be reasonable to use the labor share as a proxy for ²L, but in the case of China, where many
product and factor markets remain heavily regulated, this is obviously more problematic.
DEA therefore seems a more suitable approach for analyzing productivity growth in China's
provinces than the standard growth accounting framework.7
3 Empirical Analysis
We calculate labor productivity growth and e±ciency levels for a sample of 28 provinces
between 1978 and 1998. Value added and investment data are from the provincial yearbook
of China.8 Labor data are from Young (2000), who compiled the data from provincial
yearbooks, A Compilation of Historical Statistics (State Statistical Bureau, 1990), and
Hsueh, Li and Liu (n.d.). More detailed information about data sources and the construction
of variables is provided in the appendix.
Before turning to the discussion of e±ciency indexes, it will be interesting to look at the
dynamics of productivity change across provinces. All provinces record increases in labor
productivity between 1978 and 1998 (Table 1). The average annual growth rate for all
provinces is 7.2 percent over this period, but productivity performances vary substantially
between subsets of provinces. While labor productivity in the coastal provinces of Fujian,
Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang grows at an annual rate of about 10 percent, labor
productivity in the landlocked provinces of Heilongjiang, Gansu, and Qinghai grows at an
average annual rate of only 4-5 percent.9 In 1978, the coastal provinces are on average
less productive than the landlocked provinces. In a ranking of provinces by level of labor
7We were confronted with two additional problems. First, for most of the provinces we did not have data
on labor compensation. Second, for the provinces where data were available, the labor shares were very
small, an issue that was also noted by Young (2005) who used data from other auxiliary sources to correct
for potential measurement errors in labor shares.
8Hainan and Tibet Autonomous Region were excluded for lack of data on value-added and ¯xed-capital
investment. We restricted our sample over the period of 1978-1998, because we did not have a comparable
labor data for recent years.
9Aziz and Duenwald (2003) report qualitatively similar results for comparisons of per capita GDP across
provinces.11
Table 1: Labor Productivity and E±ciency in 1978 and 1998
Output per Worker         Efficiency Index 
Province 1978 y 1998 y 1978 O 1998 O
Beijing 2451 10806 0.969 0.894
Tainjin 2254 9564 0.843 0.859
Hebei 868 4049 0.687 0.759
Shanxi 912 3392 0.517 0.637
Inner Mongolia  889 3619 0.594 0.671
Liaoning 1828 6247 0.918 0.794
Jiling 1270 4213 0.710 0.758
Heilongjiang 1736 4404 1.000 0.732
Shanghai 3907 19367 1.000 1.000
Jiangsu 897 7300 1.000 0.906
Zhejiang 689 5906 0.658 0.865
Anhui 608 2644 0.859 0.754
Fujian 718 5358 0.723 0.949
Jiangxi 694 2942 0.601 0.761
Shandong 759 3864 0.778 0.782
Henan 580 2618 0.585 0.694
Hubei 790 4433 0.654 0.846
Hunan 645 2292 0.826 0.804
Guangdong 817 6402 0.611 0.871
Guanxi 521 1974 0.576 0.723
Sichuan 580 2323 0.437 0.645
Guizhou 442 1474 0.460 0.534
Yunnan 526 1981 0.443 0.563
Shaanxi 754 2677 0.500 0.559
Gansu 933 2248 0.573 0.631
Qinghai 1074 2397 0.541 0.558
Ningxia 959 2849 0.590 0.641











Sources: Provincial Yearbooks of China and authors estimates 
Note: Capital intensity (capital per worker) and labor productivity (labor 
per worker) are in terms of Yuan per worker. 12
Figure 2. Provincial Productivity Distributions in 1978 and 1998
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b. Productivity Distribution in 1998













































































































7th, 12th, and 16th; respectively, while Qinghai and Gansu rank 8th and 10th;
respectively. However, the coastal provinces did not just catch up with the initially more
productive landlocked provinces, they surpassed them: as by 1998, Fujian, Guangdong, and
Zhejiang rank 8th; 5th; and 7th; respectively, while Qinghai and Gansu rank 22th and 25th;
respectively. Although the di®erence in average growth rates between these two groups of
provinces is consistent with their initial levels of labor productivity, there is no convergence
in the mean across whole China.10 To provide a better understanding of the dynamics, in
Figure 2a and 2b we plot the (kernel) distributions of productivity levels in 1978 and 1998.11
In 1978 overall distribution has a unimodal shape; while it has new peaks in 1998. Our
purpose is to identify the factors that are responsible for this change in overall distribution.
Turning now to the e±ciency indexes reported in Table 1,12 we note that Heilongjiang,
10We formally tested for absolute convergence in labor productivity across provinces by running the
regression g
i





y denotes the average annual growth rate of labor productivity
of province i between 1978 and 1998 and "
i is the associated error term. The estimate of ¯1 is ¡0:0038 and
is insigni¯cant with a standard error of 0:0047:
11More information on the construction of Kernel distributions are provided in Appendix B.
12These results are (slightly) di®erent from our earlier results in the IMF working paper, because here
capital stocks are constructed using longer investment series, which makes estimates more reliable (see
appendix A).13
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Jiangsu, and Shanghai have e±ciency indexes of 1 in 1978. 13 This result implies that our
non-parametric approach excluded 25 provinces from the technology frontier. Figure 3.a
illustrates the positions of the provinces relative to the technology frontier in 1978 and
suggests considerable dispersion of production activities.
The last column of Table 1 reports the e±ciency indexes in 1998. In that year, only
Shanghai has an e±ciency index of 1.14 Figure 3.b represents the production set and its
frontier in 1998. The frontier is shaped by the input-output combinations of Anhui in 1984,
Fujian in 1994, Shanghai in 1985, 1997, and 1998. To clearly show the relative positions
of the provinces in 1998, we excluded all other previous observations in the interior of
the production set. Compared with the Figure 3.a, we note that production activities are
generally closer to the frontier in 1998 than in 1978. Indeed, the average e±ciency index
for all provinces increased from 0.686 in 1978 to 0.746 in 1998, while the standard deviation
declined from 0.178 to 0.128 over the same period. These trends suggest convergence both
13The e±ciency indexes are calculated by solving the linear programming problem (5) for 1978 and 1998.
In 1978 we have only 28 observations. In 1998, however, we have 588 observations (28 for each year over 21
years).
14We have calculated these statistics for each year and we found that Shanghai always remained on the
frontier. These results are available from the authors upon request.14
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in the mean and the standard deviation of e±ciency indexes across provinces over 1978-98. 15
At this point it is important to notice that the technical progress has not shifted the frontier
by the same proportion at each capital-labor ratio. For example, between 1994 and 1998
the lower part of the frontier remained the same. This simply implies that the technical
progress has not been Hicks-neutral.
Figure 4 illustrates the kernel distributions of e±ciency indexes in 1978 and 1998. Two
important points emerge from this ¯gure. First, note that there is a (weak) shift in the
distribution towards 1 between 1978 and 1998. This shift further con¯rms the convergence
over this period. Second and more importantly, the shapes of the distributions are mostly
the same in both years, which suggest that e±ciency can not be a driving factor for the
change in the shape of productivity distribution between 1978 and 1998 (see Figure 2).
To determine which factor has played the most signi¯cant role on provincial growth
dynamics, we now turn to the decomposition of labor productivity into capital deepening,
15Similar to the labor productivity case, to test for absolute convergence in e±ciency across provinces we
run the regression g
i





¸ denotes the average annual growth rate of e±ciency
index of province i between 1978 and 1998 and "
i is the associated error term. The estimate of ¯1 is ¡0:0243
and is signi¯cant with a standard error of 0:0042; supporting our contention of absolute convergence in
e±ciency indexes.15
Figure 4. Provincial E±ciency Distribution in 1978 and 1998































e±ciency gains, and technological progress. Table 2 shows the results of this decomposition
and the relative contributions of the three factors to productivity growth between 1978 and
1998. Note that average productivity growth is 7.2 percent of which 5.2 percentage points
are contributed by capital deepening. Thus, about 75 percent of productivity growth across
China's provinces is explained by capital deepening, with technical progress and e±ciency
changes accounting about 18 and 7 percents, respectively, of the productivity growth. 16
The high contribution of capital accumulation to labor productivity growth is consistent
with the standard growth accounting studies of the sources of overall GDP growth in China
(Chow (1993), Chow and Li (1999), and Heytens and Zebregs (2003); and with studies of
the sources of GDP growth in other East-Asian economies (Young 1995).
Although on average most of the productivity improvement is attributable to capital
deepening, provincial level decompositions show some di®erent trends. We ¯nd, for exam-
ple, that the relative contribution of capital deepening to average annual labor productivity
growth in Heilongjiang, Anhui, Hunan, and Shandong during 1978-1998 is at least 90 per-
16This conclusion remains mostly the same when we even consider sub periods. Between 1978 and 1990,
for example, about 78 percent of countrywide productivity growth is explained by capital deepening. Con-
tributions of technical progress and e±ciency changes, on the other hand, are about 13 and 9 percents,
respectively. These results are available upon request.16
Table 2: Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth, 1978-1998













cap g Efficiency  Technology  Capital 
Beijing 7.4 -0.4 3.2 4.6 -5.4 43.5 61.9
Tainjin 7.2 0.1 3.0 4.1 1.3 42.1 56.6
Hebei 7.7 0.5 1.0 6.2 6.5 13.4 80.1
Shanxi 6.6 1.0 1.0 4.6 15.9 15.2 68.9
Inner Mongolia  7.0 0.6 1.0 5.4 8.7 14.8 76.5
Liaoning 6.1 -0.7 2.0 4.8 -11.8 33.2 78.6
Jiling 6.0 0.3 1.1 4.6 5.5 18.6 75.9
Heilongjiang 4.7 -1.6 1.3 4.9 -33.5 27.9 105.6
Shanghai 8.0 0.0 4.3 3.7 0.0 53.6 46.4
Jiangsu 10.5 -0.5 2.1 8.9 -4.7 20.0 84.7
Zhejiang 10.7 1.4 1.7 7.6 12.7 15.5 71.8
Anhui 7.3 -0.7 0.7 7.3 -8.9 9.8 99.1
Fujian 10.0 1.4 1.2 7.4 13.5 11.8 74.6
Jiangxi 7.2 1.2 0.6 5.5 16.3 8.1 75.5
Shandong 8.1 0.0 0.9 7.2 0.3 10.6 89.1
Henan 7.5 0.9 0.6 6.0 11.3 8.3 80.4
Hubei 8.6 1.3 1.0 6.3 14.9 11.3 73.8
Hunan 6.3 -0.1 0.7 5.7 -2.1 11.0 91.2
Guangdong 10.3 1.8 1.8 6.7 17.2 17.7 65.1
Guanxi 6.7 1.1 0.7 4.9 17.1 9.9 73.0
Sichuan 6.9 1.9 0.6 4.4 28.1 8.9 63.0
Guizhou 6.0 0.7 0.6 4.7 12.4 10.8 76.8
Yunnan 6.6 1.2 0.6 4.8 18.1 9.7 72.2
Shaanxi 6.3 0.6 0.8 4.9 8.8 11.9 79.3
Gansu 4.4 0.5 0.6 3.3 11.0 14.0 75.0
Qinghai 4.0 0.2 0.6 3.2 3.9 14.7 81.4
Ningxia 5.4 0.4 0.5 4.5 7.6 9.9 69.5
Xingiang 8.1 1.3 1.2 5.6 15.7 14.9 69.5
Mean 7.2 0.5 1.3 5.4 7.0 18.0 75.0
Sources: Provincial Yearbooks of China and authors estimates based on equations (9) and (10).17
cent, while it is less than 65 percent in Beijing, Tianjing, Sichuan, and Shanghai. We also
see that while changes in the technical progress have important contributions to produc-
tivity growth in Beijing, Tianjing, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and in particular, Shanghai; in
Jiangxi, Guanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan improvements in e±ciencies have more signi¯cant
e®ect than technical progress on productivity growth.
At this point it will be interesting to investigate the e®ects of each factor on the dis-
tributional dynamics of labor productivity. To isolate the e®ects of changes in e±ciency
on the initial productivity distribution, we construct counterfactual labor productivity, yE;
in 1998 by multiplying each labor productivity observation in 1978 by the corresponding
change in the e±ciency index over 1978-98, i.e. yE ´ (¸98=¸78) £ y78: The kernel distri-
bution of yE is shown by the dashed-line in Figure 5 and notice that this transformation
did not change the unimodal shape of the labor productivity distribution in 1978 (compare
with Figure 2.a). To see the e®ect of technical progress, we further multiply yE by the
second term in (10). This e®ect is illustrated by the solid-line in Figure 5. This operation
has shifted the distribution down and made the tail of distribution ticker, but the shape
of distribution remains mostly unchanged. This analysis shows that the capital-deepening
is also the driving factor on changes in the distributional dynamics of labor productivity.
Indeed if we multiply the second distribution by the last term (i.e. capital-deepening) in
(10) we will obtain Figure 2.b.
An important remaining question is whether there is any systematic relationship between
the growth rates of the three components of labor productivity growth and the initial level
of labor productivity. To investigate this, we regressed the average annual growth rate
of each variable on initial labor productivity along with other variables that might have
possible e®ects on these growth rates.17 The regression results are presented in Table 3.
17Two caveats need to be emphasized. First, we have only 28 observation which make estimates less
precise. Second, the causality may run in the other direction as well. For example, initially more e±cient
provinces might attract more domestic and foreign investment. The best way to address the second issue is
to use instrumental variables approach. Unfortunately, there is no good instrument to control this reverse
e®ect.18
Figure 5. Counterfactual Productivity Distributions in 1998


























































Coastal Dummy      0.014** 
(0.008)




    0.012** 
(0.007)









2 R 0.435 0.363 0.786 0.354
Notes: There are 28 observations and numbers in parentheses represent the (robust) standard errors. * (**) 
means the corresponding coefficient is significant at the 5% (10%) level.  19
Column 1 represents results where the dependent variable is labor productivity. Here the
costal dummy is signi¯cant at the 10% level, while the FDI/GDP and initial productivity
level are signi¯cant at 5%. Given that the coe±cient of the initial labor productivity
is negative and signi¯cant supports the conditional convergence hypothesis. There is a
positive and signi¯cant correlation between FDI and labor productivity growth which is in
line with Zebregs (2003) results. Column 2 shows the results when the dependent variable is
the average annual growth rate of e±ciency index. The coe±cient of the initial productivity
is negative and statistically signi¯cant. This suggests that improvement in e±ciency was
higher in initially less advanced provinces than in richer ones, which is consistent with
our earlier observation. We also see that FDI had a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on
e±ciency growth. When we regressed change in technology on the initial productivity level
and other control variables, we found that coe±cient of the initial productivity is positive
and statistically signi¯cant (see Column 3). This suggests that initially more productive
provinces have bene¯ted more from technological progress than less developed provinces.
This result is in support of theories of technological di®usion that conjecture that the cost of
adopting new technologies declines with the level of economic development or the abundance
of human capital in the receiving location.18 It is also interesting to note that the coe±cient
of FDI is positive and statistically signi¯cant. Finally, Column 4 represents results when the
dependent variable is the growth rate of capital deepening. The negative and signi¯cant
coe±cient of the initial labor productivity suggests that capital deepening was higher in
initially less developed provinces. Surprisingly, neither FDI nor domestic investment had
any signi¯cant e®ects on the growth rate of capital deepening.
4 Conclusion
We have used a recently developed non-parametric approach to decompose labor productiv-
ity growth in China's provinces into three components: capital deepening, e±ciency gains,
18See for example Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Findlay (1978).20
and technological progress. This decomposition has allowed us to investigate the contri-
bution of each of the three factors to the pattern of productivity growth across provinces.
We ¯nd that capital deepening is by far the biggest source of labor productivity growth in
China's provinces between 1978 and 1998. We also ¯nd that capital deepening is the prime
factor for the change in the dynamics of labor productivity.
E±ciency is improved between 1978 and 1998, especially in the initially least produc-
tive provinces which often has the largest agricultural sectors. The e±ciency gains are
almost certainly a re°ection of China's economic reforms, which have facilitated a profound
transformation of the country's economic structure, including a large reallocation of labor
from unproductive farming and state-owned enterprises to more productive industries in
the non-state sector.
Technological progress was generally largest in the initially more productive provinces
in line with theories of technological di®usion. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, technolog-
ical progress in the coastal provinces, which recorded the largest in°ows of FDI, was not
noticeably higher than in other provinces. A possible explanation is that FDI in the coastal
provinces did not introduce important new technologies because it was concentrated in
low-tech sectors or did not have signi¯cant spillovers to the rest of the local economy.
A Data Appendix
This appendix provides additional information about our data sources and the construction
of capital stocks. We obtained provincial level output (GDP) data from various issues of
the Statistical Yearbook of China.
Labor data reported in the Statistical Yearbook of China contain large swings and do not
take into account the possible change in employment due to migration between provinces.
For example, according to the reported series there was a substantial decline in employment
levels since mid-1980. We instead used a data set compiled by Young (2000). [We found the
employment trends of this data set to be quite reasonable: for example, on overall average21
annual growth rate of employment between 1978 and 1998 was 2.4.]
Physical capital is accumulated according to
Kt+1 = It + (1 ¡ ±)Kt; K0 > 0;
where It and Kt denote investment and capital stocks, respectively, at time t; ± > 0
represents the depreciation rate and K0 is the initial capital stock. Thus, to compute
capital stocks at time t we need investment data, depreciation rates, and estimates of initial
capital stocks. We used investment data from the IMF database which was compiled from
various issues of the provincial yearbook. This data set is available from 1952. However, we
noted that the data were considerably low and volatile in the pre 1965 era. Furthermore, we
found that the reported investment de°ators very volatile and implausible.19 As a result,
we used GDP de°ator to de°ate investment series.20 We assumed that the depreciation
rate ± is 5 percent. We calculated initial capital stocks by K65 = I65=(g + ±); where g is
the annual growth rate of the capital stocks before 1965,21 which we also assumed to be
5 percent. Finally, we obtained the foreign direct investment data from the IMF database.
B Kernel Estimator of a Distribution Function
A kernel estimator of a set of observations is an estimated distribution function from which
the observations were likely driven. Speci¯cally, a kernel-based estimator, ~ f(x); of a density
19For example, using these investment de°ators we found that in some provinces in some years investment
to GDP ratios were greater than 1.
20Even in this case we found some anomalies in the series. For example, investment to GDP ratio in
Shanghai is on average less than 15 percent before 1980s. In that case, we assumed that the investment
to output ratio between 1965-78 is the same with the average of the investment to output ratios of other
provinces in the region. Similarly, we further noted that the investment data for Qinghai and Ningxia
were relatively high over 1978-98. For example, their investment to GDP ratios were above 50 percent
and in some years even reached 70 percent. Given that there are no signi¯cant changes in their output
trends, we concluded that measurement errors could be one possible reason for these high investment levels.
Consequently, we assumed that the investment to output ratio in each of these provinces is the same with
the average of the investment to output ratios of other provinces in the region. These adjustments do not
have any impact on either the position of frontier or the e±ciency levels of other provinces. Without these
adjustments, we estimated lower e±ciency indexes for these provinces.
21Implicit in this formula is the assumption that the capital series has been growing at constant rate
before the investment data became available. Young (1995) and Hall and Jones (1999) also used the same
technique to estimate initial capital stocks.22














¡1 Ã(s)ds = 1 with s = (xi ¡ x)=h; and h is called optimal window width (or
smoothing parameter). Here Ã is weighting function and in this paper, following Kumar
and Russell (2002) and Aziz and Duenwald (2003), we assume that Ã is a standard normal
density function. Following Silverman (1986), the optimal window width is chosen to be
given by h = 0:9AN¡0:2; where A = minfstandard deviation, interquartile range/1.34g:
For more detail discussion on kernel estimators, see Silverman (1986).23
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